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Are Donors Afraid of Core Costs?
Economies of Scale and Contestability in Charity Markets
SHORT TITLE: Core Costs in Charity Markets
Carlo Perroni Ganna Pogrebna
Sarah Sandford Kimberley Scharf∗
We study contestability in charity markets where non-commercial, not-for-profit pro-
viders supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale tech-
nologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, the absence of price-based sales
contracts for charities means that fixed costs can translate into entry barriers, protecting
the position of an inefficient incumbent; or, conversely, they can make it possible for in-
efficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from
laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance
and perceived risk can lead to inefficient technology adoption.
KEY WORDS: Charities, Donations, Contestability
JEL CLASSIFICATION: L1, L3, D4
Charities face significant fixed operating costs,1 just as for-profits do, but there is ample anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that fixed costs present special challenges for them. For example,
they often lament that donors are typically unwilling to fund their ‘core’ costs,2 and that
this makes it difficult for newcomer charities to get off the ground and for more established
incumbent charities to cover overheads; and they consistently lobby government to step in
with grants to help fund their fixed costs.3
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1Spends on direct programme costs reported by UK charities range from 1% to 65% of their income (True
and Fair Foundation, 2015).
2As Rosemary McCarney, CEO of Plan Canada, put it, ‘There’s an idea out there that a charity is good if
it only spends 20% on administration and fundraising and 80% on program costs, and if you’re out of that
approximate range, somehow you’re bad or inefficient.’ Often the ratio of variable to fixed costs is taken as
an indicator of provision efficiency (see, for example, the charity rating system adopted by MoneySense, a
not-for-profit Canadian consumer advocacy organisation).
3The difficulties that charities face in persuading donors (especially small ones) to make donations that are
not earmarked towards project costs and can be used to fund core costs leads charities to formulate specific
core funding strategies. See, for example, Institute for Philanthropy (2009). Gneezy et al. (2014) also note
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As Baumol and Willig (1981) first pointed out, fixed costs that are not sunk need not
impede entry and efficient selection of producers in for-profit markets. By analogy, the same
conclusion might be thought to apply to charities: provided that donors are fully informed
about charities’ performance, unfettered competition between charities should enable those
charities that deliver the highest value for donors to attract the most funding, making them
best positioned to meet their fixed costs; less efficient charities that cannot cover their fixed
costs would then be (efficiently) selected out.
In this paper, we show that the analogy does not apply, and that, unlike in the case of
for-profit providers, the presence of fixed costs can impede competition between charities
and give rise to inefficient selection. When there are economies of scale in production, the
selection of efficient modes of provision involves a coordination problem amongst users,
irrespectively of whether the good provided is a private good or a public good. For pri-
vate goods sold in for-profit markets, this coordination problem is solved by price-based
contracts: adopting high fixed cost technologies can potentially give rise to losses if de-
mand falls short of the scale of production that warrants incurring those fixed costs, but,
by acting as residual claimants for any potential surplus or shortfall, the most technologi-
cally efficient for-profit providers can induce coordination of buyers towards their offering.4
In contrast, not-for-profit providers face a statutory non-distribution constraint: costs and
revenues must balance out – in the long-run, at least. Absent a residual claimant, the selec-
tion of efficient technologies must directly rely directly on donors’ ability to coordinate their
donations efficiently. As a result, when there are fixed costs, non-cooperative contributions
equilibria – as characterised by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) – can be associated with
inefficient selection.
The fact that with economies of scale in provision the selection of charities involves a
donor coordination problem implies that existing models that are widely used to study com-
petition and entry in the for-profit sector – typically variants of Chamberlin’s (1933) monop-
olistic competition model – cannot be mechanically adapted to characterize not-for-profit
competition simply by positing that not-for-profit organizations pursue objectives other than
profit maximization; and it implies that studying inter-charity competition in the presence
of scale economies involves asking similar questions to those that have been examined in
the literature on coordination games – questions and arguments that are of little relevance
when looking at competition between for-profit providers. What is distinctive in the donor
coordination problem is that its structure can be mapped from technological conditions. In
the context of charity competition, the coordination problem can also shape entry and exit
that donors are averse to making donations to charities that have large overhead costs, and show that large
donations earmarked towards overhead costs can be effective at overcoming this aversion. However, they do
not address the implications of differential cost structures for donor coordination, as we do here.
4A commercial firm’s bottomline only matters to its customers if sales contracts involve long-term compo-
nents, e.g. an advance payment for later delivery or important maintenance and warranty elements. In the
vast majority of cases, the bulk of the delivery of goods and services takes place at the time of sale.
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decisions by providers.
We borrow constructs from the experimental literature on coordination games to char-
acterize contribution choices and selection outcomes in situations where there are multiple
providers with different cost characteristics and where donor coordination on a provider is
(or is perceived to be) noisy – for example, because donors view other donors’ actions as
boundedly-rational. We show that failure by donors to select the most efficient provider di-
rectly relates to a comparison between fixed costs of different providers; specifically, donor
coordination on charities that adopt comparatively more efficient technologies with com-
paratively higher fixed costs may be successfully undermined by the availability of less ef-
ficient charities facing lower fixed costs. This weakens the ability of more efficient, higher
fixed cost providers to successfully compete against lower fixed cost providers, and can thus
translate into an inefficient barrier to entry that protects the position of less efficient incum-
bents against challenges by more efficient challengers; or into an inefficient ‘entry breach’
that allows less efficient challengers to successfully contest the position of a more efficient
incumbent.
We then design and carry out a series of laboratory experiments in order to explore
the efficiency/fixed-cost trade-offs described above. Our theoretical conclusions are con-
firmed experimentally: fixed cost driven trade-offs result in significant mis-coordination in
donation choices, and this is anticipated by potential competitors, which affects their en-
try choices. The arguments we develop here and our experimental findings are reflected in
the prominence given by charities to core funding strategies, and set out a pro-competitive
based rationale for why government funding of fixed costs may be called for in the case of
non-commercial, not-for-profit providers – to offset the adverse effects of scale economies in
provision on entry and technology adoption incentives.
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, our study is the first to
address the implications of differential cost structures for donor coordination, that is, the im-
plications of asymmetric donation thresholds for donors’ decisions about which charities to
allocate their donations to. There is a large theoretical and experimental literature on volun-
tary giving. Within this literature, the studies that are most closely related to ours are those
that address contribution choices towards threshold public goods.5 Those studies focus on
how donation thresholds (which can also be interpreted as fixed costs) affect levels of giv-
ing (i.e., decisions about how much to contribute to a project), whereas here we deliberately
abstract from this question by taking the level of donations as given, and we study instead
the choice between alternative threshold public goods (i.e., decisions about which project
to contribute to), and on how coordination amongst different donors is shaped by tradeoffs
across different technological characteristics.
Second, our study is the first to highlight the behavioural channels through which tech-
nologies can affect inter-charity competition. The debate on conduct and performance in
5Amongst others: List and Lucking-Reilly (2002); Bracha et al. (2010); Gneezy et al. (2014).
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the not-for-profit sector vis-a`-vis the for-profit sector has mainly stressed the implications
of organizational form for internal performance along various dimensions,6 but research
on inter-charity competition is comparatively scant.7 The role that fixed costs play in con-
testable charity markets has so far not been studied.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the donor co-
ordination problem in the presence of fixed costs and formalises the notions of ‘fixed-cost
bias’ and ‘incumbency bias’ in the context of a behavioural model of donor choice. Section
2 focuses on selection and entry. Section 3 presents experimental evidence, also deriving
structural estimates of parameters for the behavioural model. Section 4 discusses exten-
sions. Section 5 concludes.
1 Choosing between Decreasing-average-cost, Not-for-profit
Providers
We begin our discussion by setting out the donor coordination problem in the presence of
fixed costs, and then we derive predictions about donor behaviour. In the next section we
use these predictions to derive implications for selection and entry.
Consider N donors each with exogenous income y. Each donor contributes one dollar
towards the provision of a homogeneous collective good. The collective good is provided
by two non-commercial, not-for-profit suppliers, j ∈ {1, 2}. Both face a non-distribution
constraint, i.e. their profits must be zero.8 This constraint can be viewed as an endogenous
response to output verification constraints – an idea that has been discussed extensively in
the literature going back to Hansmann (1980); that is, if service delivery is not verifiable in
contractual arrangements, providers facing a zero-profit constraint would outperform for-
profit providers, and consequently the not-for-profit organisational form would be selected.9
6These dimensions include information and agency costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Hansmann, 1980;
Easley and O’Hara, 1983; Glaeser and Schleifer, 2001); differential regulatory and tax regimes (Lakdawalla and
Philipson, 2006); and access to a pro-socially motivated workforce (Ghatak and Mueller, 2010).
7A number of studies have focused on the implications of fundraising efforts (Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Cas-
taneda et al., 2008; Aldashev et al., 2014). Other studies have focused on the regulation of inter-charity compe-
tition in non-contestable markets (Philipson and Posner, 2009) and on the implications of adverse selection for
charity selection (Scharf, 2014; Kasteva and Yildirim, 2016).
8In a dynamic setting, short-run profits can be positive or negative even when there is a non-distribution
constraint, but profits must be zero in the long run. However, in our static framework, a non-distribution
constraint translates directly into a zero-profit constraint. In the language of Hansmann (1980), such providers
are donative non-profits.
9With collective consumption, overall output may be difficult to verify even when deliveries to individual
purchasers are fully verifiable. This makes the verification problem comparatively more likely to occur in the
case of collective goods, as the following example illustrates. Suppose that two individuals each contribute
an overall amount v towards provision of a purely collective service with marginal cost c = 1; even if each
4
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The production of the collective good occurs through increasing returns technologies
that feature a constant marginal cost, cj, and a fixed, non-sunk cost, Fj, j ∈ {1, 2} ≡ J. In
the remainder of our discussion, we assume Fj ∈ [1, N − 1], i.e. that donations by a single
donor are not sufficient to cover fixed costs, but that donations by N − 1 donors always are.
The provider with the more efficient technology – the low-cost charity – will thus be the one
that delivers the higher level of output (at the lower average cost) when all contributions are
directed towards it, i.e.
arg max
j∈J
N − Fj
cj
. (1)
The low-cost charity may well be the one with the higher fixed costs, as exploiting scale
economies typically requires incurring larger fixed costs in order to reduce variable costs.
There is some similarity between our setup and that studied by Andreoni (1998), but the
question we study here – the choice of which charity to select as the beneficiary of an exoge-
nously given level of donation is fully orthogonal to the question he examines – how much
to give to a charity.
Absent pricing decisions, charities are passive recipients of donations, i.e. there is no
choice that they have to make (we will later touch on providers’ entry and technology adop-
tion decisions that may precede the contribution game we are studying here). As donation
levels are exogenously given, the only determinant of donors’ payoff that is relevant to the
problem we want to study is the total level of provision of the collective good.
1.1. Non-cooperative Contribution Equilibria
Since donation choices are made independently by individuals, the relevant equilibrium
concept is non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium. The presence of fixed costs translates into
the possibility of multiple non-cooperative equilibria:
PROPOSITION 1. When two non-commercial charities providing collective goods face fixed costs
that are not sunk, all provision will be carried out by a single provider, which can be either the
high-cost provider or the low-cost provider, with the low-cost equilibrium being the payoff dominant
equilibrium.
PROOF: If N1 ≤ N donors give to charity 1 and N2 = N − N1 ≤ N give to charity 2, total provision
will equal max{(N1 − F1)/c1, 0}+ max{(N2 − F2)/c2, 0}.10 An outcome with N1 strictly between 0
and N cannot be an equilibrium: if 0 < N1 < F1, then any donor giving to charity 1 could bring about
contributor is able to verify that an amount v is provided as a direct consequence of her own individual con-
tribution, she may be unable to verify that an additional amount v is also provided as a result of the other
individual’s contribution. In this case, the provider may be able to supply a total amount v (rather than an
amount 2v) and still satisfy its contractual obligations with each of the two contributors.
10We therefore assume that provision cannot become negative – or equivalently, that if the difference be-
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an increase in output (and thus in her payoff) by redirecting her donation to charity 2; analogously,
if 0 < N − N1 < F2, i.e. N1 > N − F2, any donor giving to charity 2 could bring about an increase in
output by redirecting her donation to charity 1; if F1 ≤ N1 ≤ N − F2, then if c1 < c2 a donor giving
to charity 2 could raise output by switching to charity 1, and, vice-versa, if c2 < c1 a donor giving
to charity 1 could raise output by switching to charity 2. So, the only possible pure-strategy (Nash)
equilibria are N1 = 0 and N1 = N. There always also exists a ‘knife-edge’ mixed-strategy equilibrium
where players mix between the two charities. This equilibrium, however, is Pareto dominated by
either of the two pure-strategy equilibria, and can be ruled out by standard refinements – such as
trembling-hand perfection (Selten, 1975) or evolutionary stability (Smith and Price, 1973). 
It is useful to contrast this result with the conclusion that applies to an analogous com-
mercial, for-profit scenario. Consider the following sequence of moves: (i) firms 1 and 2
simultaneously select prices p1 and p2; (ii) consumers select a supplier. In the second stage
consumers will select the supplier that charges the lower price, and so profits for firm j will
be equal to N(pj − cj)/pj − Fj = N(1− cj/pj)− Fj if pj < p−j, to (N/2)(pj − cj)/pj − Fj if
pj = p−j (assuming an equal split of the market for equal prices), and to zero if pj > p−j.
The best response for firm j is then to strictly undercut its rival as long as doing so results in
a non-negative profit. Then, supposing 1 is the low-cost firm, a non-cooperative equilibrium
will involve firm 2, the high-cost firm, selecting p2 = Nc2/(N − F2), and firm 1, the low-
cost firm, selecting a price p1 that is only marginally less than p2; this results in zero profits
for the high-cost firm and a positive level of profits for the low-cost firm; in this outcome,
neither firm 1 nor firm 2 will be able to obtain a higher profit by unilaterally increasing or
decreasing the price it charges, and so all production will be carried out by the lower-cost
producer.
The difference between the non-commercial, not-for-profit case and the commercial, for-
profit case is that coordination between donors towards efficient charities is more difficult
to achieve than coordination of consumers towards efficient firms, because in the case of
for-profit firms consumers can be ‘herded’ effectively through price competition – firm 2
can undercut firm 1 and induce all consumers to switch. Firm 2 can do this credibly as
consumers need not concern themselves about whether the firm will succeed in meeting its
objectives; i.e. if firm 2 were not to succeed in attracting buyers, it would make a loss but
the price a consumer has paid for its services would not be revisited. This is not the case
for non-commercial charities: charity 2 is unable to make a corresponding binding offer to
all donors that it will provide more for each dollar received than charity 1 does. This is
because charity 2 is a not-for-profit entity with no residual claimants, and thus devotes all
of its resources to provision. Accordingly, a failure to successfully contest the position of
tween donations received and Fj is negative, this difference can be funded in some way (privately or by the
government). An alternative assumption that leads to the same conclusion is that whenever a charity receives
donations that fall short of F, it does not directly engage in provision and instead diverts the donations it
receives towards another charity.
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charity 1 will be reflected in its level of provision rather than its profits. Thus, donors would
only switch to charity 2 if they believed that other donors would also choose charity 2 – and,
as a consequence, no donor will switch.11
The above analysis only tells us that multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria are possible,
but it does not tell us which of these is more likely to occur. While Pareto dominance may be
an appealing theoretical criterion for equilibrium selection, it has little behavioural content –
even though it might play a role in how people behave. If we want to model and study how
donors choose between different increasing returns providers, we need to look elsewhere.12
In what follows, we will develop arguments and predictions concerning competition
and entry focusing on two effects, which we term incumbency bias and low-fixed cost bias. The
first refers to the simple idea that donors may view coordination on the incumbent as focal,
giving the incumbent an advantage. The second relates to the fact that, if fixed costs are
large, coordination mistakes on the part of donors – as we define them more precisely below
– are more likely to lead to provision failure. We elaborate on these concepts below.
1.2. Noisy Play and Incumbency
To give substance to the ideas of incumbency bias and low-fixed cost bias, we can deploy
constructs and ideas from the experimental literature on coordination games. For the re-
mainder of our analysis, we restrict attention to scenarios where charity 1 is both the low-
average cost and the high-fixed cost charity, and replace the labels 1 and 2 respectively with
H and L. We also normalise parameters so that the full-coordination payoff for charity L –
the low-fixed cost, inefficient provider – equals unity, while the full-coordination payoff for
charity H – the higher-fixed cost, more efficient charity – equals 1+ δ > 1 (with δ > 0). The
fixed cost level of charity H is expressed as
FH = F, (2)
(dropping the subscript), and the fixed cost level of charity L as
FL =
FH
1+ φ
, φ ≥ 0. (3)
Given this normalization, the remaining cost parameters can then be expressed as
cH =
N − F
1+ δ
; (4)
11Analogous inefficiencies can arise for not-for-profit firms that price at average cost, e.g. consumer cooper-
atives (Enke, 1945).
12Andreoni (1998) points to fundraising as a possible solution to the problem of achieving coordination
amongst donors in the presence of a donation threshold. In the setting that we study here, the total level of
donation is given, and so fundraising cannot alter the structure of the problem: two non-passive charities that
place a premium on their own provision would both face similar incentives to exert effort in targeting donors.
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cL = N − F1+ φ . (5)
Note that under this normalization a change in φ only affects the ratio of fixed costs, not the
comparison of the full-coordination payoffs for the two options. We shall refer to δ as the
dominance premium and to φ as the fixed cost premium.
Additionally, we shall restrict attention to scenarios where, for both charities, donations
by a single individual to a charity cannot result in a positive level of provision by that charity,
i.e., where both FH and FL are greater than unity; in turn, given our parameterisation, and
since FH = F ≥ FL = F/(1+ φ), this requires F/(1+ φ) ≥ 1 and thus
F ≥ 1+ φ. (6)
With reference to this scenario, suppose that donors conjecture that the actions of other
donors might be either based on uninformed beliefs – meaning that some donors might
not best respond to the actions of other more informed donors and may thus fail to co-
ordinate to a given equilibrium – or be noisy, i.e. actions might result from choices that
systematically depart from optimising choices, then higher fixed costs make coordination
on the more efficient, higher-fixed cost provider more ‘risky’. Then, if choices are (conjec-
tured to be) sufficiently noisy, the dominance ranking of equilibria in terms of their expected,
full-coordination payoffs, can be overturned in favour of the less efficient, lower-fixed cost
option.
We fully formalize this idea in the next section, but for illustrative purposes it is useful
to focus first on a specific example: a case with three donors (N = 3) each having one unit
of cash, and with F = 2, implying that at least two donors giving to H are required for the
fixed cost FH = F to be covered and that three donors are needed for H to deliver a positive
level of output. Let x = NH be the number of donors giving to H (making the number of
donors giving to L equal to N− x = NL). Payoff levels as a function of x are shown in Figure
1 for δ = 1/10, φ = 1/3.
Suppose next that each player can be one of two types, fully rational (R), or fully irra-
tional (C), with the latter choosing one charity at random, i.e. each with a probability 1/2;
and suppose that a donor’s type is private information. If the N donors are drawn at ran-
dom from a large population where a fraction ζ of donors are of type C (and a fraction 1− ζ
are of type R), with ζ being the common belief amongst all donors, the probability (as seen
from another player) of an individual donor being of type R – and thus selecting a charity
on the basis of a payoff-maximising response to the choices of other players – is 1− ζ, while
the probability of an individual donor being of type C – and thus randomising between the
two – is ζ.13
13The resulting game is one of incomplete information and the relevant equilibrium concept is Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. However, we use this construct here to build intuition with respect to the dominance ranking,
not as a way of characterising equilibria. To the latter end, in Section 1.3 we invoke the concept of Quantile
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Figure 1: Payoffs as a Function of the Number of Donors Selecting Charity H
δ = 1/10, F = 2, φ = 1/3
If donors can make mistakes in this way then option H is a comparatively ‘riskier’ coor-
dination target than option L is, because if a single donor fails to coordinate on H, output
is zero, whereas if a single donors fails to coordinate on L, output remains positive. On the
other hand, if full coordination is successful, H dominates L. Note that at least three donors
are required to generate this type of tradeoff: with only two-players, there are just three
possible outcomes, and the only criterion for ranking H and L is payoff dominance.
Next consider a candidate equilibrium where all players of type R coordinate on charity
H, i.e. they all choose to give to H. If each of these donors conjectures that the probability
of another donor choosing charity H is (1− ζ) + ζ/2 = 1− ζ/2 ≡ 1− γ (i.e. γ = ζ/2),
then from the point of view of each donor of type R who attempts coordination on H along-
side the other R-type donors, the number of donors who will actually give to H will be
three with probability (1 − γ)2, it will be two with probability γ(1 − γ) (with one donor
giving to L), and it will be one with probability γ2 (with two donors giving to L). The as-
sociated expected payoff for a representative donor of type R considering coordination on
H, if risk-neutral, is (1− γ)2 (1 + δ) + (2γ2 φ)/(1 + 3 φ) ≡ EQH. If, on the other hand, all
Response Equilibrium (QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which is a technically more suitable (if perhaps less
intuitive) solution concept in this context. The above construct can also be viewed as a special case of a level-k
reasoning framework (Stahl and Wilson, 1994), where level-0 players randomise between the two charities and
level-1 players best-respond to an assumed distribution of level-0 and level-1 players in proportions ζ and
1− ζ.
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Figure 2: Ratio of Expected Payoffs under Full Coordination
δ = 1/10, F = 2
players of type R attempt coordination on charity L, then, from the point of view of each
of these donors, the number of donors who will actually give to L will be three with prob-
ability (1− γ)2, it will be two with probability γ(1− γ) (with one donor giving to H), and
it will be two with probability γ2 (with two donors giving to H). The associated expected
payoff for a risk-neutral representative donor of type R considering coordination on L, is
(1− γ) (1− γ (1+ φ)/(1+ 3 φ)) ≡ EQL.
Figure 2 shows how the ratio EQH/EQL varies with γ for the same parameterization that
was used to generate Figure 1. In this case, for γ = 1/9 the full-coordination payoff for
the dominant option is approximately equal to 0.87, whereas the corresponding payoff for
the dominated option is approximately 0.86 < 0.87; for γ = 1/5 the ranking is reversed:
0.72 for the dominant option versus 0.75 > 0.72 for the dominated option. The effects of an
increase in φ on the dominance ranking is illustrated in Figure 2, with reference to the exam-
ple introduced earlier. Raising φ – which, by construction, leaves full-coordination payoffs
unchanged – lowers the ratio EQH/EQL for any γ ∈ (0, 1/2], and can therefore overturn the
ranking of expected payoffs. For example, for γ = 1/9, raising the fixed-cost premium to
φ = 1, makes the full-coordination payoff for the dominant option approximately equal to
0.88, and that for the dominated option approximately equal to 0.89 > 0.88.
Risk aversion, if present, only works to strengthen the risk dominance implications of
fixed costs. In the above example, for γ = 1/9, the ratio EQH/EQL is greater than unity
under risk neutrality; if, however, output, Q, in each realization is valued according to the
Bernoulli utility function u(Q) = ln(1 + Q), we obtain E[u(Q)]H = 0.6 and E[u(Q)]L =
0.605 > 0.6, i.e. a comparatively lower γ is now required to overturn dominance.
The idea behind the notion of incumbency bias is that, in the presence of multiple equi-
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Figure 3: Ratio of Expected Payoffs under Full Coordination – Incumbency Effects
δ = 1/10, F = 2, φ = 1/3, charity L is the incumbent
libria, pre-existing coordination on any given choice makes that choice a natural choice
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). An incumbency bias/status quo bias effect such as this
might thus provide protection to an incumbent charity against a challenger. The incumbent
charity may be charity L (the high-cost, low-fixed cost charity) – in which case incumbency
would work to protect L against a more efficient, dominant challenger, i.e. incumbency
would offset dominance; or it may be H (the low-cost, high-fixed cost charity) – in which
case incumbency would work to protect H against a less efficient, lower-fixed cost chal-
lenger, i.e. incumbency would offset the fixed cost-related risk advantage of charity L.
Incumbency bias can be formally incorporated into the preceding framework as a sys-
tematic departure by players of type C from a fifty-fifty choice rule, i.e. by assuming that
players of type C select the incumbent charity with probability (1+ µ)/(2+ µ) > 1/2 (µ >
0) and the challenger with probability 1/(2+ µ). Thus if any given charity is the incumbent,
and if players of type R coordinate on that charity, that charity will be selected by each of the
other players with probability (1− ζ)+ ζ(1+ µ)/(2+ µ) = 1− ζ/(2+ µ) ≡ 1−γI ; whereas
if players of type R coordinate on the non-incumbent charity, it will be selected by each of
the other players with probability (1− ζ) + ζ/(2 + µ) = 1− ζ(1 + µ)/(2 + µ) ≡ 1− γN;
and so γN = γ(1 + µ)/(1 + µ/2) > γ > γI = γ/(1 + µ/2). In other words, incumbency
bias introduces an asymmetry between L and H in the perceived probability of mistakes,
which in turn alters the comparison between full-coordination expected payoffs in favour of
the incumbent.
With reference to our earlier example, Figure 3 illustrates the effect of incumbency bias on
the expected payoff ratio EQH/EQL for different values of γ, in a scenario where the payoff
dominated option, L, is the incumbent option. Incumbency of the low-fixed cost charity, L,
lowers the minimum value if γ required to overturn dominance in its favour.
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1.3. Quantal Response Equilibria
The above discussion has introduced the idea of noisy actions, allowing us to develop some
intuition about the tradeoff between the payoff ranking and the ‘riskiness’ of alternative co-
ordination choices. Dominance, however, does not translate into a formal characterization of
equilibrium play – it just provides a ranking of alternative, pure-strategy equilibria from the
point of view of fully-rational players. One way of modelling mixed-strategy equilibrium
play – and thus rationalising experimental outcomes where different boundedly-rational
players can make different choices – is to posit that players adopt ‘approximate’ best re-
sponses; specifically, that the actual best-response correspondence adopted by the players
is a smoothed version of the theoretical, fully-rational best-response. By doing this, be-
havioural mistakes are incorporated and reflected in the mixed strategy choices of players,
which arise endogenously as an approximate best response to the strategies of other play-
ers. This idea gives rise to the concept of quantal response equilibrium (QRE, McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995), a construct that has been widely adopted in the applied literature as a way of
rationalising and interpreting experimental data. If the smoothed best response is based on
payoffs that are perturbed according to a logit error structure, the fixed-point equilibrium
condition for equilibrium mixed strategies in a symmetric Logit QR (LQR) equilibrium, with
reference to the problem we are studying, is identified by
qH =
exp
(
λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1]
)
exp
(
λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 0]
)
+ exp
(
λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1]
) ; (7)
where qH is the equilibrium probability of a player selecting charity H (with 1− qH being
the equilibrium probability of a donor selecting charity L); and where
E[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 0] =
N
∑
x=1
(
N − 1
x− 1
)
(qH)x−1 (1− qH)N−x
(
QH(x− 1)+QL(N− x+ 1)
)
;
(8)
E[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1] =
N
∑
x=1
(
N − 1
x− 1
)
(qH)x−1 (1− qH)N−x
(
QH(x) + QL(N − x)
)
. (9)
The degree to which players engage in fully rational play is reflected in the parameter λ: for
λ = 0, the mixed strategy choice is always 1/2 (tossing a coin), whereas for λ approaching
infinity, the QRE concept coincides with that of Nash Equilibrium.14
14Accordingly, for λ approaching infinity, the game admits two stable pure-strategy equilibria and an un-
stable mixed-strategy equilibrium. For λ finite, different equilibrium set typologies can arise: (i) multiple
equilibria of which only the pure strategy ones are stable (for λ large); (ii) multiple mixed-strategy equilibria
of which some are stable (as λ becomes smaller); (iii) a single, stable mixed-strategy equilibrium (as λ becomes
even smaller).
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It can be shown that, other things equal, high fixed costs can negatively affect the equilib-
rium probability of selecting the dominant, high fixed cost providers in a Quantal Response
equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 2. In a left-hand neighbourhood of qH = 1, the level of qH in a stable equilibrium
is a non-increasing function of the fixed cost premium, φ.
PROOF: Let ∆(qH) ≡ E[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 0]− E[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1]. The fixed-point condition
for a QR equilibrium can be written as
qH − 1
1+ exp
(
λ∆(qH)
) ≡ Ω(qH, φ) = 0. (10)
Stability of the above fixed point requires ΩqH (the partial derivative of Ω(qH, φ) with respect to qH)
to be positive. The comparative statics effects of a change in φ on qH are obtained as
D qH
D φ
= − Ωφ
ΩqH
. (11)
Since ΩqH > 0 is required for stability, the sign of DqH/Dφ is opposite to the sign of Ωφ, which is the
opposite of the sign of ∂∆(qH)/∂φ. Thus, qH is decreasing in φ if and only if ∆(qH) is decreasing in φ.
To establish how ∆(qH) varies with φ for qH < 1 in a neighbourhood of qH = 1, we can focus on
lim
qH→1
∂2∆(qH)
∂φ ∂qH
=
∂
∂φ
(
lim
qH→1
∂∆(qH)
∂qH
)
. (12)
This equals −(N − 1)(N − 2)F/(N(1 + φ) − F)2 ≤ 0 if F < 2(1 + φ) and is zero if F ≥ 2(1 + φ),
which, by continuity, implies that, for qH sufficiently close to unity, the expression ∆(qH) is (weakly)
decreasing in φ and therefore qH is (weakly) decreasing in φ. 
Thus, for qH high enough, an increase in the fixed cost gap between the two options,
holding the full-coordination payoffs of the two options constant, (weakly) lowers the probability
of individual players selecting the high fixed cost, efficient option.15 Intuitively, a higher
fixed cost gap can make the dominated option comparatively less risky for any given qH –
lowering the gap between a donor’s expected payoff from choosing H and L, and so other
things equal, the level of qH at which a donor is indifferent between selecting H and L must
fall.
The above result applies for any value of N; and indeed, as the following constructive
argument demonstrates, equilibria with qH < 1 are possible even when N is large. Suppose
that, for a given N = N0 and λ = λ0, there exists a unique, interior QR equilibrium with
15The conditions for qH to be strictly increasing in φ need to be separately derived for each N; in Section 3
we will focus on the case N = 3 and we will discuss conditions for that case.
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qH ≡ qH ∈ (0, 1), implying that coordination of donations on a single charity cannot be
supported as an equilibrium, and write the condition identifying an equilibrium as
qH =
1
1+ exp
(
λ0 ∆(qH, N0)
) , (13)
where ∆(qH, N0) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1 (explicitly including the number
of donors as an argument). If we now consider values of N above N0, we can always find
a λ 6= λ0 s.t. λ∆(qH, N) = λ0 ∆(qH, N0), and, thus, such that qH is still an equilibrium. For
this to be the case, as we increase N above N0, we need to keep varying λ according to
Dλ
DN
= − N0
∆(qH, N0)
∂∆(qH, N)
∂N
. (14)
Thus, failure to coordinate on the efficient charity can occur no matter how large the number
of donors is.16
Incumbency bias can be incorporated into the QRE framework by adding the term ln(1+
µmj), j ∈ {H, L}, to the arguments of the exponential functions, where mH and mL are
indicators that are either zero or one, depending on whether H or L is the incumbent, and µ
is a non-negative parameter. So, for example, if L is the incumbent, we obtain
qH =
exp
(
λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1]
)
exp
(
ln(1+ µmL) + λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 0]
)
+ exp
(
λE[Q | qH−i = qH, qHi = 1]
) .
(15)
This specification implies that, for λ = 0, we have qH = 1/(2 + µ) < 1/2 if L is the incum-
bent and qH = (1 + µ)/(2 + µ) > 1/2 if H is the incumbent, whereas for λ → ∞, µ has no
effect on play. For finite values of λ, it can be immediately verified that qH is increasing in µ
if H is incumbent and is decreasing in µ if L is the incumbent.
In Section 3 we use the QRE solution concept as a tool for interpreting our experimen-
tal results. Specifically, we derive structural estimates of the behavioural parameters of a
QRE specification from experimental data, and then use those parameters to characterize
the comparative statics properties of predicted equilibrium choices with respect to changes
in cost parameters around the estimated equilibrium.
16It should be noted that a larger number of donors does not necessarily translate into the requirement of
a smaller λ (i.e., donors being more ‘irrational’) for mis-coordination to occur. For example, with F = 2,
δ = 1/2, φ = 1/3, λ0 = 1, 000 and N0 = 3, there is a stable QR equilibrium featuring qH ≈ 0.937. If we
raise the number of donors to N = 4, the value of λ required for qH ≈ 0.937 to remain an equilibrium is
λ ≈ 5, 791 > 1, 000. As we discuss later in Section 4, we should also expect a larger donor pool to be associated
with larger inframarginal costs.
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2 Implications for Competition and Entry
We now come to the heart of our discussion: how fixed costs in charity provision affect char-
ity selection in charity markets. Our results so far imply that fixed costs can impede donor
coordination on the more efficient provider – by skewing the dominance comparison against
high fixed cost providers and/or by lowering the mixed-strategy equilibrium probability of
high fixed cost providers being selected by donors. Implications for charities’ entry and exit
choices immediately follow from our previous analysis.
With reference to the two-charity scenario we have focussed on so far, suppose now that
each of the two charities has the option to exit (or not to enter), given the entry choice of the
other charity; and suppose that each charity’s objective is
Vj = (1+ω)Qj + Q−j, j ∈ {H, L}; (16)
where ω > 0 is a ‘warm-glow premium’ that charities attach on own provision simply by
virtue of being involved in its provision – despite the fact that charities provide a homoge-
nous good (as in Scharf, 2014). Following entry choices, if both charities have entered, provi-
sion outcomes are determined by donors’ choices, as characterized in the previous section; if
only one charity is present, all donors give to the remaining charity; if no charity is present,
provision is zero.
Then, a charity’s calculation of whether or not it should participate involves a compari-
son between the payoff it obtains if it does not participate and the payoff it obtains if it does.
The former payoff is zero if the other provider also chooses not to participate, and is oth-
erwise equal to the full-coordination payoff that relates to the alternative charity – which,
by our normalization equals unity for H if it is H that chooses not to participate and equals
1+ δ for L if it is L that chooses not to participate (with the alternative charity participating).
The latter payoff is 1+ δ (for H) or 1 (for L) if the other provider chooses not to participate,
and is otherwise equal to the payoff level that can be expected to arise in the binary choice
problem as we have analysed it so far; in a QR equilibrium with mixing probability qH, this
is equal to E[VH; qH] for provider H and E[VL; qH] for provider L.
If ω = 0, i.e. if charities are entirely pro-socially motivated, E[VH; qH] and E[VL; qH]
coincide with each other and also with the common payoff that donors obtain. For qH strictly
between 0 and 1, this common payoff is always less than the full-coordination payoff of
1+ δ that obtains when all donors select H or when H is the only provider. Not only is this
payoff greater, but if one of the charities exits (or does not enter in the first place), this payoff
obtains with certainty, and so this outcome unambiguously dominates all other outcomes.
Thus, although the entry game may also admit equilibria where H exits (or does not enter),17
the favoured equilibrium for all parties is one where L exits (or refrains from entering), and
therefore there need not be any competition failure.
17If qH is such that E[Q; qH ] < 1, then an outcome where L enters and H does not enter is also an equilibrium.
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If, however, ω > 0, then E[VH; qH] and E[VL; qH] are not the same. Since E[VH; qH] and
E[VL; qH] are both increasing in ω, the payoff gaps that determine entry choices (E[VH; qH]−
1 for H and E[VL; qH]− (1+ δ) for L) are increasing in ω, implying that, if ω is large enough,
outcomes will no longer be Pareto-rankable. Several different scenarios can then arise, some
of which involve inefficient selection:18 (i) ω > δ but both E[VH; qH] < 1 and E[VL; qH] <
1+ δ, the entry game has a ‘Hawk-Dove’ structure, admitting two equilibria that cannot be
Pareto ranked – with either H or L as the only provider; (ii) if E[VH; qH] > 1 and E[VL; qH] <
1+ δ, then the only outcome will be one where H is the only provider – the efficient outcome;
(iii) if E[VH; qH] < 1 and E[VL; qH] > 1+ δ, then the only outcome will be one where L is the
only provider – an inefficient outcome; (iv) if E[VH; qH] > 1 and E[VL; qH] > 1+ δ, then the
only equilibrium outcome will be a duopoly – an inefficient outcome from the donors’ point
of view.
In cases where L is the only provider – case (i), with H inactive, and case (iii), with L being
the only provider – fixed costs translate into an inefficient entry barrier that protects the
position of a less efficient provider. In case (iv), the duopoly outcome, fixed costs translate
into a failure to repel inefficient challengers, making it possible for a less efficient provider
to enter and survive competition. None of the above would be relevant to the entry choices
made by for-profit providers: there, the only equilibrium outcome would be one with H as
the only active provider.
Note that by raising E[VH; qH] a higher ω could in principle improve selection if it brings
about (ii) rather than (i). In other words, if a higher ω makes the efficient provider compara-
tively more aggressive and willing to participate, inducing exit by the less efficient provider,
it could play a positive selection role. However, it can be shown that, other things equal, a
higher ω raises entry incentives for the less efficient charity more than it does for the more
efficient charity:
PROPOSITION 3. Provided that the dominance premium, δ, is sufficiently small, an increase in
own provision bias, ω, raises the expected payoff of the less efficient provider – when it is chosen by
donors with probability approaching unity – comparatively more than it increases the expected payoff
of the more efficient provider – when it is chosen by donors with the same probability.
PROOF: The expressions for E
[
VH | qH
]
and E
[
VL | qH
]
are respectively
E
[
VH | qH
]
=
N
∑
x=0
(
N
x
)
(1− qH)N−x (qH)x
(
(1+ω)QH(x) + QL(N − x)
)
; (17)
E
[
VL | qH
]
=
N
∑
x=0
(
N
x
)
(1− qH)N−x (qH)x
(
QH(x) + (1+ω)QL(N − x)
)
. (18)
18The possibility of inter-charity competition giving rise to inefficiencies was first raised by Rose-Ackermann
(1982) with respect to fundraising. Analyses of selection failure in the charity sector include Romano and
Yildirim (2001), Scharf (2014), and Krasteva and Yildirim (2016).
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Proceeding along lines similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2, the derivative with respect to
ω of the difference between the limit of ∂E
[
VH | qH
]
for qH approaching unity and the corresponding
limit of ∂
(
E
[
VH, | qH
]
/(1+ δ)
)
/∂qH for qH approaching zero can be written, after simplification, as
−(1+ δ)N
(
1
(N − F)(δ+ω+ δω)2(N − F) −
1(
N − F/(1+ φ))(δ−ω)2
)
; (19)
which, evaluated at δ = 0, equals
−N φ/(1+ φ)
ω2(N − F)(N − F/(1+ φ)) < 0, (20)
and so is negative for δ sufficiently small. 
This implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in ω is more likely to encourage entry by the
low fixed cost, inefficient provider (case (iii)) than by the high fixed cost efficient provider
(case (ii)), as the following example illustrates. Consider once more a scenario with N = 3,
F = 2, δ = 1/10, φ = 1/3 – the same we considered in Section 1.2 – and suppose that
qH = 1/2. In this case, for ω < δ = 1/10 an outcome where H is the only provider is an un-
dominated equilibrium; for ω between 1/3 and 2.85 there are two undominated equilibria,
each with a single provider; for ω between 2.85 and approximately 4.45 the only equilibrium
features L as the unique provider; for ω > 4.45, both providers participate; i.e. case (ii) never
occurs. Intuitively, when donors select the two charities with equal probabilities, own pro-
vision bias bolsters the entry stance of the inefficient, low fixed cost charity comparatively
more, because it attaches a premium to positive levels of outputs which, for the same low
level of donations, would be larger for the low fixed cost charity.
Incumbency bias can affect entry outcomes simply because it affects the probability with
which each donor selects a provider, raising it for the incumbent and lowering it for the
challenger. It can therefore help offset selection failure – when the efficient provider is the
incumbent – or it can exacerbate it.
If, additionally, own output-biased charities can select a technology from a set of avail-
able technologies, selection failure can take a different form: given that low fixed costs confer
a competitive advantage, charities may choose to forgo the adoption of high fixed cost tech-
nologies that allow them to exploit scale economies and opt for inferior technologies instead.
When two competing providers have access to the same technologies, the immediate con-
clusion would be that, for ω sufficiently large, both providers would choose to enter and
would select the inefficient, low fixed cost technology, i.e. they would engage in a techno-
logical race to the bottom. Thus, not only can fixed costs impede efficient entry and exit,
or allow inefficient entry and exit, but they could also impede efficient technology adoption
and innovation.
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3 Laboratory Experiments
We have designed and carried out two linked sets of experiments. The first set of exper-
iments explores how fixed-cost based trade-offs lead to suboptimal choices of individual
donors and coordination failures in giving and provides a direct test of the predictions con-
tained in Section 1. The second set of experiments explores how donor coordination out-
comes are reflected in entry and exit decisions, in line with the analysis of Section 2.
3.1. Donor Coordination Experiments
In Experiment 1 (the Baseline Experiment) of the set of donor coordination experiments,
participants were asked to play forty rounds of the following game: at the beginning of each
round they are split in groups of three people each by a random draw;19 they are then asked
to choose between two options, one of them (potentially) payoff dominant but involving a
higher fixed cost, as discussed in the previous section.
Payoffs (derived from underlying cost parameters) were chosen so that deviation by a
single player from the dominant option results in a payoff equal to zero. A representative
payoff profile, as the number of players choosing the dominant option progressively in-
creases from zero to three, has therefore the structure
(
x, α x, 0, (1 + δ)x
)
, with δ ≥ 0 and
0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, with x, α and δ varying across treatments (the order is reversed in alternative
treatments).20 Denoting with b each player’s notional contribution, the implied cost param-
eters, in relation to our earlier theoretical setup, are as follows: FH = 2b, cH = (b/x)/(1+ δ),
FL = 3b− b/(1− α) < FH, cL = (b/x)/(1− α) > cH. The implied fixed-cost premium is
therefore φ = α/(2− 3α), which is positively related to α. The number of distinct experi-
mental subjects who participated in the lab sessions is 102.
Laboratory experiments where conducted in the Behavioural Science Laboratory at War-
wick Business School using the Decision Research at Warwick subject pool. For the first set
of experiments, 102 participants were recruited. The majority of participants were under-
graduate students at the University of Warwick: more than 70% of them studied Economics,
Psychology or Business Administration; the rest were studying other subjects. The major-
ity of participants had some experience with economic experiments, but none of them had
taken part in similar experiments before. The average age was 21. Almost exactly half of the
19N = 3 is the smallest level of N for which there can be asymmetric, partial coordination outcomes (i.e.
more donors coordinating on one charity than on the other, short of full coordination).
20A zero payoff may be perceived by subjects as being especially salient; this would have an effect analogous
to that of risk aversion (e.g. it would be tantamount to the zero payoff being ‘counted’ by subjects as a negative
payoff, rather than a zero); but it would not change our theoretical predictions nor our interpretation of the
experimental results. In the maximum likelihood estimation exercise we discuss below, we allow for non-
linearities.
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participants were male and half were female.21
The experiment was conducted using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Upon arriving at the laboratory, each participant was seated at a workspace, equipped
with a personal computer, scratch paper and a pen. The workspace of each participant
was private; the session was monitored and any communication between participants was
strictly forbidden. Participants received experimental instructions on a computer screen.
At the beginning of a session, instructions were read aloud by the experimenter, and par-
ticipants had an opportunity to re-read the instructions and ask individual questions. Par-
ticipants were also asked to play a practice round; the payoff structure used in the practice
round did not repeat any of the combinations used in the experiment. The experiment lasted
approximately one hour. On average, participants were paid £11.30 inclusive of the show-up
fee. In order to make sure that participants understood the games, in the post-experimental
questionnaire we also asked them to indicate whether they found the experimental design
challenging and/or to point out specific pathways for potentially improving the experimen-
tal design. None of the participants indicated having difficulties in understanding the design
of the experiment. The majority of comments indicated that the instructions were “straight-
forward” and “easy to follow”.
An additional set of thirty subjects used an online experimental portal for a treatment
variant where payoffs were paid to an actual charity.
Twenty distinct payoff structures were used as a basis for the treatments in each round of
the experiment. These are shown in Table 1, ordered in terms of number of players selecting
the high-fixed cost option. Note that in some of those treatments we allowed for the low-
fixed cost option to dominate the high-fixed cost option, i.e. we allowed for a negative δ.
Accordingly, in the analysis of results we examine choices with reference to the level of fixed
costs rather than dominance, but we draw a distinction between treatments where δ > 0
and those where δ < 0.
For simplicity, and in order to insure that players could easily understand the game and,
at the same time, not be influenced by the framing of the experiment, the two available
options were labeled as ‘Green Option’ and ‘Purple Option’. To control for possible order
effects, the colour attached to the high fixed-cost option was randomised, and we also varied
the displays shown to the participants: in some sessions payoffs were displayed in terms of
increasing number of players choosing Green over Purple, and in other sessions the order
was reversed. Thus, although we specified only twenty different payoff structures, the num-
ber of rounds each participant was asked to play was forty. The stranger design we adopted
minimises learning effects. Furthermore, participants did not receive feedback about their
payoffs from previous rounds until the very end of the experiment.
In most treatments, subjects were asked to choose one of the options without a default
choice being made for them. In others (Experiment 2), a default choice is made for them,
21Detailed statistics about the first set of experiments are provided in Appendix A, Table A.1.
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Table 1: Payoff Treatments
No. of players
selecting H
0 1 2 3
Payoff
treatment
Payoffs
1 200 100 0 200
2 200 100 0 201
3 200 100 0 205
4 200 100 0 210
5 200 100 0 215
6 180 50 0 175
7 180 50 0 180
8 180 50 0 181
9 180 50 0 185
10 180 50 0 190
11 150 70 0 145
12 150 70 0 150
13 150 70 0 155
14 150 70 0 160
15 150 70 0 165
16 175 25 0 145
17 175 25 0 160
18 175 25 0 175
19 175 25 0 190
20 175 25 0 205
H: high-fixed cost option
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and subjects had the option of overturning it. We included this treatment variant in order to
investigate incumbency effects. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects were shown pre-calculated
payoffs. In Experiment 3, subjects were required to derive the payoffs themselves on the
basis of cost parameters and a set of detailed instructions.
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for subjects’ choices (frequencies) in the base sample
of 102 subjects across the twenty basic treatments, both in aggregate and broken down by
incumbency treatment variant.
Coordination performance is poor. If we calculate the corresponding mean payouts by
treatment, we find that, on average, groups achieve a payoff that is only 58% higher than
what would be achieved under fully random choices – if all players selected options at ran-
dom each with probability of one-half. This is significantly less that what could be theo-
retically achieved if all players always coordinated on the dominant option – which would
average to 177% more than the average payoff under random play. In other words, if we
removed the dominated option from the set of options available to subjects, their average
payoff would increase by more than 75%. If we removed the dominant option instead, the
players’ average payoff would still increase by 66%.
To investigate the relationship between subjects’ choices and payoff structures, which
reflect underlying technological differences, we can focus on normalized payoffs, which are
derived as follows. Denoting with xHt , x
L
t and x
PC
t , in any given treatment t, respectively
the full-coordination payoff for the high-fixed cost option (H), the full-coordination payoff
for the low-fixed cost option, and the partial-coordination payoff associated with the low
fixed-cost option (L), we compute Dominance Gapt = xHt /x
L
t = 1+ δt, and Fixed Cost Gapt =
xPCt /x
L
t = αt (which, as discussed before, is positively related to the fixed cost premium).
If we focus on stable, mixed-strategy QR equilibria for the case N = 3, as shown in
the proof of Proposition 2, the sign of the comparative statics effects of a parameter β (ei-
ther the dominance premium, δ, or the fixed cost gap, α) on the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium probability of selecting H agrees with the sign of Ωβ(qH, β). For N = 3, we have
Ωδ(qH, β) = λ(qH)2 Ξ, where Ξ ≡ exp
(
λ(EH − EL))/(1 + exp (λ(EH − EL)))2 > 0 –
which implies DqH/Dδ > 0; and Ωα(qH, β) = λ
(
3(qH)2 − 4qH + 1)Ξ – which implies that
DqH/Dα > 0 is negative if qH > 1/3 and positive or zero otherwise. In light of this, we
could expect changes in δ across treatments to produce an effect of the same sign across
treatments, and changes in α to produce effects of different sign depending on whether or
not H is payoff dominant.
Table 3 presents results of random-effects logit panel regressions, where the dependent
variable is the log of the odds of selecting the high-fixed cost option and the independent
variables are the dominance gap (1 + δ), the fixed cost gap (α), and incumbency treatment
indicators. For the reasons just discussed, we also include an indicator flagging those sce-
narios where option H is payoff dominated, and separate coefficients for α for treatments
where H is dominant and treatments where H is dominated – as a rough way of allowing
for the non-monotonicity implied by the theory. Column 1 of Table 3 shows results for the
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Table 2: Experimental Choices:
Choice Frequency for High-Fixed Cost Option
(All Subjects)
Payoff
treatment
No default L default H default All variants
1 0.206 0.233 0.100 0.197
2 0.441 0.600 - 0.477
3 0.456 0.467 0.533 0.466
4 0.574 0.800 0.767 0.621
5 0.588 0.667 0.767 0.617
6 0.039 0.233 0.167 0.076
7 0.132 - 0.350 0.182
8 0.456 0.400 0.400 0.443
9 0.475 0.567 - 0.496
10 0.554 - 0.633 0.572
11 0.069 - 0.033 0.057
12 0.147 0.667 0.633 0.261
13 0.475 0.700 0.700 0.527
14 0.544 0.533 0.533 0.542
15 0.549 0.567 0.567 0.553
16 0.078 0.067 0.167 0.087
17 0.049 0.033 - 0.042
18 0.172 0.067 0.067 0.148
19 0.642 0.833 0.867 0.689
20 0.799 0.833 0.867 0.811
H: high-fixed cost option; L: low-fixed cost option
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Table 3: Individual Choice: Panel Random-effects Logit Regressions
Dependent variable: logit
(
Prob{Choice = High-fixed cost option})
Full sample Subjects compute
payoffs
(1) (2)Regressors
Dominance gap (H/L): 1+ δ 15.599∗∗∗ 17.898∗∗∗
(1.356) (2.388)
H dominated -3.267∗∗∗ -2.884∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.600)
Fixed cost gap if H dominant: α = 2φ/
(
1+ 3φ
)
-1.165∗∗ -2.207∗∗
(0.475) (0.775)
Fixed cost gap if H dominated 1.545∗ 0.458
(0.675) (1.133)
H default 2.316∗∗∗
(0.583)
L default -0.152
(0.582)
Subjects must compute payoffs 0.446
(0.557)
Constant -16.103∗∗∗ -17.735∗∗∗
(1.542) (2.623)
Observations 4,080 1,320
Subjects 102 33
Fraction of variance due to individual effects 0.614 0.526
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p< 0.001, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗ p< 0.05
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full sample, whereas column 2 focuses on the sub-sample of subjects who were asked to
calculate payoffs.
Looking at the full sample, the effect of the dominance gap on the probability of selecting
H is positive and significant. The sign of the effect is as would be trivially expected, but the
statistical significance of the effect indicates that individuals do trade off full-coordination
payoff dominance against other considerations, rather than just choosing the payoff domi-
nant option. The sign on the coefficient for α is negative and significant for treatments where
H is dominant. This is in line with theoretical predictions. It is worthwhile stressing how
this finding should be interpreted: our normalisation implies that changes in α do not affect
the comparison between the two options in terms of their overall performance under full
coordination, i.e. a higher fixed-cost gap, as measured by α does not make H less efficient;
nevertheless, it makes the choice of H less likely in those cases where H is the dominant
option. In cases where H is dominated, the effect of a higher α, is positive and significant.
As noted above, this sign reversal is aligned with theoretical predictions.
Incumbency effects are as would be expected: incumbency of H has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the probability of H being selected, while incumbency of L has a negative
effect; however only the first effect is statistically significant. Asking subjects to derive pay-
offs, or earmarking payouts to charity, has no significant effect in the full sample (column
1). Restricting the analysis to the sub-sample where subjects are asked to derive payoffs
delivers strikingly similar results (column 2), suggesting that computational complexity (or
lack thereof) does not play a central role in shaping behaviour. Augmenting the base sample
with the additional 30 subjects whose payoff went to charity gives very similar results (not
shown), with the ‘charity treatment’ indicator being statistically insignificant.22
These results suggest that, even though subjects tend to avoid the high fixed cost option,
they are more likely to select it if it presented to them as the default option. The fact that
incumbency effects are not statistically significant for the low fixed cost option is not sur-
prising because subjects in our experiments tend to favour the low fixed cost option over
the high fixed cost options anyway, and there is no reason why we should expect subjects to
favour the low fixed cost option even more when it is presented as the default option.
We next carried out maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of a QRE model
as described in Section 1.3. We focused on three model variants: (i) one without incum-
bency effects, where the only structural parameter is λ; (ii) one with incumbency effects,
with parameters λ and µ; (iii) one with both incumbency effects and with the payoff for the
high-fixed restated as x˜Ht = x
H
t + ρ(x
H
t − xLt ), where ρ is a positive scalar that measures the
22An alternative way of looking at experimental evidence is to focus on the probability of selecting the
dominant option, which coincides with H in some treatments and with L in others. Under this specification, the
combination of a negative effect of α on the probability of choosing H when H is dominant and a corresponding
positive effect when H is dominated, would translate (by construction) into a negative effect of a higher α on
the probability of choosing the dominant option in all cases. Results from this specification (not shown) are
indeed in agreement with those of Table 3.
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood QRE Estimates
Specification
Parameter (i) (ii) (iii)
λ 0.0123 0.0125 0.0115
µ - 0.1725 0.1425
ρ - - 2.98
Incremental likelihood ratio - 212.2 115.8
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,080
(i) No incumbency effects
(ii) Incumbency effects
(iii) Incumbency effects + change in valuation above min{xL, xH}
marginal valuation of payout levels in excess of xLt , and which can depart from unity;
23 this
variant has three structural parameters: λ, µ, and ρ. The reason for including specification
(iii) is the observation – clearly evidenced by the descriptive statistics in Table 2 – that sub-
jects’ choices are dramatically affected by a switch in the dominance relationship between
xHt and x
L
t : for example, when moving from payoff treatment 1 to 2, which both feature
xLt = 200, a change in x
H
t from 200 to 201 raises the measured frequency of H being cho-
sen from 0.206 to 0.441 in the no-incumbency treatment variant, but the effect of subsequent
increases in xHt – as we move to payoff treatments 3, 4 and 5 – is markedly less pronounced.
For every basic treatment, we have at most two observations per subject, and so no
individual-specific parameter estimation is possible. Accordingly, in performing the esti-
mation, the choices of individual subjects for any given treatment were pooled in a single
sample.24
Maximum likelihood parameter estimates are shown in Table 4, which also shows like-
lihood ratios for moving from one specification to the next, progressively adding one pa-
rameter to the previous one. The implied value of λ is consistently around 0.012. Adding
incumbency effects significantly improves the model’s fit to the experimental data. Allowing
23This non-linear specification can be interpreted as implying loss-aversion/loss-loving, with xLt identifying
subjects’ reference point.
24Also note that, since multiple (stable) strictly mixed-strategy equilibria are possible for any given treatment
and parameter configuration, the estimation procedure involves selecting the combination of equilibrium val-
ues across all treatments that delivers the maximal likelihood value for the given parameter configuration;
and then, given those maximal values, selecting the parameter configuration that delivers the maximal overall
likelihood value.
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for non-linearities above xLt further improves the fit; more importantly, it brings predicted
equilibrium values of qH closer to the 1/3 critical point – above which the effect of a higher
fixed cost premium on qH is non-positive, consistently with the results of the previous panel
estimation results – for a larger subset of treatments where option H is the payoff dominant
option.
Table 5 shows predicted choice frequencies corresponding to specification (iii) under the
estimated parameters, alongside actual frequencies. Out of the twenty basic payoff treat-
ments we investigate, and with reference to observations for cases where there is no incum-
bency treatment, observed frequencies for all twenty scenarios are ”right” in terms of the
predicted comparative statics effects, i.e. they exceed 1/3 in treatments where the high-
fixed cost option is also the payoff dominant option or fall short of 1/3 in treatments where
the high-fixed cost option is the payoff dominated option – implying that in all scenarios a
higher normalized fixed cost premium (holding δ constant) is predicted to lower the proba-
bility of choosing H, as is indeed implied by our earlier regression results. Of the predicted
frequencies from the QRE estimation, thirteen out of twenty are on the right side of 1/3, and
only two out of twenty are on the wrong side of 1/3 by more than 10% – i.e. less than 0.3 if
H is dominant and greater than 0.367 if H is dominated; in other words, there are no clear
outliers that are obviously at odds with an augmented QRE specification. In 75% of all cases
the sign of the experimental effect on choice frequency of moving from one game to another
– a total of 20× 19 possible comparisons, shown in Appendix A, Table A.3 – agrees with the
effect that is predicted by the theory.
3.2. Experiments on Entry/Exit Choices
To explore implications of coordination outcomes on entry/exit choices, we designed a sec-
ond set of experiments that build on the coordination experiments presented in Section 3.1..
We ask subjects to choose between a safe prospect that corresponds to the full coordination
outcome for one of the two options in the previous coordination experiment, and a risky
prospect that involves all four possible coordination outcomes from the coordination game,
each occurring with a probability that is equal to its experimental frequency (from the previ-
ous experiment). The safe prospect is the outcome that would prevail if only one of the two
giving options was present, i.e. if one of the two charities chose not to participate – either by
exiting or by not entering in the first place. The risky prospect is what individuals face ex
ante if both options are present, i.e. if both charities participate.
We divided participants into groups of four people each. Each group consists of players
of two types: one player is appointed to choose between the safe and the risky prospect
(decision-maker), while three players act as passive recipients of that choice (passive recipi-
ents). These types were assigned randomly at the beginning of each experiment and stayed
the same through all treatments. Including passive recipients enables us to account for the
possible effects of other-regarding preferences on the choice of the decision-maker.
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We also incorporated departures from pure pro-social motivation by allowing for the
decision-maker to attach a premium µ ≥ 0 to one of the two donation options from which
the safe and risky prospects are derived – producing different payoffs for the decision-maker
in comparison with those of the passive recipients.
We focused on a subset of eight games amongst those we used for our previous exper-
iments – games 3, 5, 13, 15, 23, 25, 33, and 35 – and for each of these we examined four
types of treatments. In each of these treatments, the risky prospect for the receivers was
obtained by combining the point payoffs corresponding to each outcome for the game with
the empirical probabilities obtained from the experiments presented in Section 3.1..25 The
risky prospect for the decision maker in Treatments 1 and 2 is calculated by taking the same
empirical probabilities and multiplying the point payoff in outcome 1 for receivers by 1+ µ
and keeping the rest of point outcomes the same as those of receivers. The risky prospect for
the decision maker in Treatments 3 and 4 is calculated by taking the same empirical prob-
abilities and multiplying the point payoffs in outcomes 3 and 4 for receivers by 1 + µ. The
point payoff for the decision-maker in the safe option is also multiplied by 1 + µ if it corre-
sponds to a full coordination outcome on which the decision-maker attaches a premium in
the given treatment. The experiment incorporated 320 questions (160 in the individual task
and 160 in the group task). It lasted 1.5 hours and each participant received, on average, £25.
The structure of these treatments is illustrated in Table 6, which refers to game 15 in the
previous experiments and assumes a premium µ = 0.2 on the H option for the decision-
maker. As detailed earlier, in game 15 each member of the three-person group receives 190
points when all group members coordinates on the H option (outcome 1); nothing if two
out of three group members coordinates on option H and one group member opts for L
(outcome 2); 50 points if one out of three group members opts for H and two coordinate on
L (outcome 3); and 180 points if all three group members coordinate on option L (outcome
4). We base the probability (frequency) of observing each of the possible four outcomes on
the results of our previous experiments: for game 15, these probabilities are 0.18, 0.47, 0.29
and 0.06, corresponding to outcomes 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The payoffs that the passive
recipients (denoted as PRs in Table 6) obtain in each realisation under the risky prospect are
simply 190, 0, 50, 180, whereas the decision-maker attaches a premium µ = 0.2 to payoffs
obtained from the H option in treatments 1 and 2 and to payoffs obtained from the L in
treatments 3 and 4, giving rise to a different payoff profile for the decision-maker (denoted
as DM in Table 6) . The safe prospect reflects either the full coordination outcome for H or for
L, yielding different payoffs for the decision-maker and the passive recipients in treatments
where the decision-maker attaches a premium to the corresponding option.
In Treatment 2, the subject appointed to make the choice places a premium on the high-
fixed cost, efficient option in the risky prospect. This treatment can be thought of as cor-
25Details of the games and of the choice probabilities derived from the first set of experiments are given in
Appendix A, Table A.4.
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Table 6: Entry/Exit Experiments: Treatment Payoffs for Game 15 and for µ = 0.2
Risky Prospect Safe Prospect
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Treatment Player(s) Pr = 0.18 Pr = 0.47 Pr = 0.29 Pr = 0.06 Pr = 1
1 PRs 190 0 50 180 190
DM 228 0 50 180 228
2 PRs 190 0 50 180 180
DM 228 0 50 180 180
3 PRs 190 0 50 180 190
DM 190 0 60 216 190
4 PRs 190 0 50 180 180
DM 190 0 60 216 216
PRs: passive recipients; DM: decision-maker
responding to scenarios where the high-fixed cost, efficient charity must make a choice be-
tween remaining active and competing with a less efficient, lower fixed cost challenger or
conceding to it (which amounts to inefficient exit). In Treatment 3, the subject appointed
to make a choice places a premium on the low-fixed cost, inefficient option in the risky
prospect. This treatment can be thought of as corresponding to scenarios where the low-
fixed cost, inefficient charity must make a choice between conceding to a more efficient,
higher fixed cost challenger or remaining active and competing with it (which amounts
to inefficient entry). In Treatments 1 and 4, the risk-less option coincides with the option
to which the chooser attaches a premium, making it comparatively more attractive to the
decision-maker than to the passive recipients. Unlike Treatments 2 and 3, these two treat-
ments do not naturally map into entry/exit choice scenarios, but are nevertheless included
for the sake of symmetry and for diagnostic purposes.
We include these four treatments for each of the eight games and for five different values
of µ (µ = 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2), ending up with a total of 160 treatments. Each player
who was chosen to be a decision maker took part in all 160 treatments. For each of these 160
treatments, we include two treatment variants: one in which there are no implications for
other subjects, the other where the choice has payoff implications for other (fully passive)
subjects, with the chooser being aware of those implications – this allows us to account for
the possible role of other-regarding motives for entry/exit choices.
A total of sixty participants were recruited for the second set of experiment – all under-
graduate students at the University of Warwick as for the first set of experiments. The sixty
subjects were randomly allocated to fifteen groups of four people each. This means that, of
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all sixty subjects, fifteen acted as decision makers and the rest as passive recipients.
Inefficient entry by the low-fixed cost, high average cost charity occurs in 23% of the cases
for treatments that correspond to this scenario (i.e. treatments where the chooser attaches a
strictly positive premium to the low-fixed cost choice in the risky prospect). When choosers
are also asked to take into account payoff consequences for other subjects, this proportion
falls to 3.5%, and the difference is statistically significant – at the 1% level according to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Inefficient exit by the high-fixed cost, low-average cost charity
occurs in 46% of the cases for treatments that correspond to this scenario (i.e. treatments
where the chooser attaches a strictly positive premium to the high-fixed cost choice in the
risky prospect). When choosers are also asked to take into account payoff consequences for
other subjects, this proportion falls to 37.5%, and the difference is again statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Thus, making the payoff consequences to other subjects salient to the
decision-maker seems to induce the decision-maker to give comparatively more weight to
the payoff dominant option – in the first case by choosing it as a safe option, in the second
case by forgoing the payoff-dominated safe option.
4 Discussion
Our analysis has intentionally abstracted from a number of real-world complications as well
as from possible alternative interpretations.26 We touch on some of these below.
Experimental Complexity and Framing Effects
When interpreting our experimental results, a possible concern is that the mis-coordination
we observe may simply follow from the relative complexity of the experimental setting
rather than from the tradeoffs highlighted in our theoretical discussion, and might not arise
in a simpler (and possibly more realistic) choice situation. As a robustness check, we have
conducted an additional two sets of laboratory experiments, with subjects selected from a
population comparable to that of our main experiments.27
The first set of experiments incorporated a ‘stag hunt’ game with the payoff structure
shown in panel (i) of Table 7 – a well-known game in which players may react to risk dom-
26Empirically identifying (outside the lab) the effects that we investigate here would need to account for
these complications. This is challenging, mainly because data on charities’ technology choices is scarce. The
Canadian dataset previously mentioned is unique in providing a systematic account of the structure of chari-
ties’ balance sheets; but, as noted earlier, information on balance sheets does not easily translate into informa-
tion on provision technologies.
27An additional 190 undergraduate students at the University of Warwick were recruited through the Deci-
sion Research at Warwick (DR@W) subject pool. Of these, 47% were female. None of the participants took part
in a similar experiment before. The experiment lasted fifteen minutes and participants received £7 on average
(inclusive of the show-up fee).
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Table 7: Payoff Structures for Reduced Complexity and Framing Treatments
(i)
A B
A 8, 8 4, 0
B 0, 4 9, 9
(ii)
A B
A 8, 8 4, 4
B 4, 4 9, 9
inance by coordinating on a payoff-dominated choice, as in our main coordination experi-
ment. When confronted with this situation, 59.3% of 32 subjects who took part in this treat-
ment (19 of 32), selected the payoff-dominated option (A).
This particular example, however, cannot be directly linked to the public good problem
we have studied, because in a public good game with only two-players the presence of fixed
costs cannot generate a payoff structure exhibiting risk dominance – at least three players are
needed. A two-player version of the game we study can only exhibit payoff dominance, as
in panel (ii) of Table 7. Still, we can use this to gauge whether, in a simple two-player choice
situation, subjects fail to coordinate on a Pareto dominant option even when there is no
tradeoff with risk dominance. Experimental results indicate that mis-coordination can occur
even in this case: 29.4% of subjects choose the payoff-dominated option (A).28 Yet, statistical
tests clearly show that mis-coordination in the stag hunt game is much more prevalent than
in this case.29
To understand the role of framing effects in relation to fixed costs – the possibility that
the very idea of fixed costs may trigger aversion independently of the effects that fixed costs
have on payoffs – we examined four treatment variants of (i) and (ii) where subjects were
told that the differences between A and B are generated by fixed costs. As discussed, a
public goods game with fixed costs is not capable of generating the payoffs in (i); neverthe-
less attaching a fixed-costs ‘label’ to alternatives may still produce framing effects that are
independent of the effect of fixed costs on payoffs. When we tell subjects that B (the pay-
off dominant option) involves costs, fewer subjects choose B in both (i) and (ii) – framing
increases the proportion of subjects choosing A from 59.3% to 70.6% in game (i) and from
29.4% to 43.3% in game (ii). When we instead tell subjects that A (the payoff dominated
option) features fixed costs, fewer subjects choose A – the proportion of subjects choosing A
decreases from 59.3% to 50% in game (i) and from 29.4% to 20% in game (ii). But statistical
tests reveal that in all cases the changes induced by framing are not statistically significant.
In contrast, as we have just seen, the structure of payoffs matters and effects are statistically
significant when we compare play in (i) and (ii); and so, if fixed costs give rise to a payoff
structure that involves a payoff vs. risk dominance tradeoff, as they do in our main exper-
28Thirty-four of our subjects played this treatment.
29Both a Pearson χ2 test and a one-sided Fisher’s exact test show significance at the 5% level.
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iments with N > 2, we should expect them to have an effect on choices that goes beyond
pure framing effects.
Large Donor Pool
Fixed costs of any given size become negligible if variable costs become increasingly large
due to an expansion of output, e.g. because the number of donors is large. Although this is
formally true in our simple model specification, in practice inframarginal costs do scale up
with the level of operation. For example, we would not expect a large manufacturer to incur
the same inframarginal costs as a small workshop; and the same would apply to charities.
Indeed, looking at charities’ balance sheets, we see that (unsurprisingly) categories of costs
– such as manager’s salaries or rental payments – that are correlated with fixed costs do
increase with the size of a charity. Thus, operation on a large scale with the support of a
large number of donors does not imply that inframarginal costs must be a negligible fraction
of total donations.
This positive relationship between size and inframarginal costs can arise from a menu
of technologies with varying fixed and marginal costs, with providers selecting higher fixed
cost, lower marginal cost technologies as they expand their scale of operation, implying that
the ratio of fixed to total costs does not become negligibly small as the size of donation
size becomes large.30 Alternatively, it may reflect the need for lumpy, short-run capacity
investment costs: fixed costs could then scale up with the size donor pool but would be
given when examining the choices of the marginal N donors – the choices we are focusing
on in our analysis.31
As we discussed in Section 1.3, independently of technological considerations (i.e. if
opportunities for exploiting scale economies do not scale up with the volume of provision),
coordination can still be partial even if the number of donors is large.
30If there are multiple technologies t ∈ {1, . . . , T} each involving a different fixed-cost level, Ft, and a dif-
ferent marginal cost, ct, and such that Ft is increasing in t, ct is decreasing in ct, and arg maxt∈T(N − Ft)/ct is
increasing in N, then a higher N calls for the adoption of a higher fixed-cost technology. This specification pro-
vides a fully general framework to model increasing-returns-to-scale technologies that may exhibit decreasing
marginal costs, whereby the technological frontier for producing the level of output Q (the production func-
tion) from a level of input X is obtained as the outer envelope maxt∈T(X− Ft)/ct.
31This would be the case in a scenario where there are a total of mN donors (m integer and positive), and
where Fj is the short-run cost that provider j must incur to install enough capacity to provide a maximum
level of output equal to N − Fjcj, with an additional cost Fj required to provide any level of output between
(N− Fj)/cj and 2(N− Fj)/cj; and so on. For-profit providers can face the same kind of lumpiness in their costs
– for example, a telecom operator with local hubs each potentially serving a certain number of local subscribers,
with the cost of servicing each hub being independent of the number of subscribers at each location.
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Output Differentiation
Donors may view the activities of competing charities as being imperfect substitutes, i.e. as
differentiated goods. Then, as is the case for private sector competitors that produce dif-
ferentiated varieties, incurring the fixed costs required to produce additional varieties may
be warranted and socially optimal. For private goods the trade-off between the benefit of
additional varieties and the additional costs involved can be resolved efficiently by market
competition – as characterised by the mainstream models of monopolistic competition un-
der product differentiation (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). As already noted, however, the
mechanics of price competition do not readily carry over to the not-for-profit case.32
While a single-provider outcome may not be necessarily the efficient outcome in this case,
donors would still face a coordination problem, and charities that are own-output biased
may still leverage on this coordination problem to displace more efficient charities, which
would result in above-optimal differentiation and sub-optimal exploitation of economies of
scale.
Unobservable Technologies
The preceding discussion has assumed that donors can directly observe charities’ technolo-
gies, which is unlikely to be the case. It may be comparatively easier for donors to observe
fixed costs (as they may materialise in the form of expenditures that are comparatively more
visible), whereas marginal costs may be harder to observe directly, and could only be in-
ferred from provision outcomes if full coordination were actually to occur. What our analysis
has shown is that, even if average cost dominance is fully salient to donors, coordination of
donations towards lower-average cost charities that have higher fixed costs can be difficult
to achieve; but if marginal costs are unknown to donors, one might expect charity selection
to be driven even more by fixed costs if these are observable.
Communication, Core Grants, Large Donors
In coordination games, communication amongst players can in principle support the selec-
tion of a Pareto dominant outcome. In the institutional context we are studying, communi-
cation would occur through the fundraising of charities and volunteers; if these are biased,
multiple and competing signals will be sent, and there is no presumption that communica-
tion should make efficient selection more likely (Cooper et al., 1992).
The coordination problem we have studIed arises from the need to cover comparatively
large fixed costs with comparatively smaller individual donations; and so it could be mit-
igated or eliminated if core costs were funded by larger lead donations from large donors
(Gneezy et al., 2014). Absent large donors, there may be a role for government to step in
32The implications of product differentiation for competition and market structure in the not-for-profit sector
have been examined by Lapointe et al. (2018).
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and to the same through ‘core’ grants. But if these grants are given indiscriminatingly to all
charities and consists of funds that are redirected from the overall pool of available funding,
reducing the size of the remaining donations (as it would be the case under a hypothetical
intervention that taxes all donations and splits revenues equally across the two charities);
and if they are still not large enough to fully cover fixed costs, their effect would actually be
to raise the relative gaps in residual fixed costs, which could actually exacerbate the donor
coordination problem.33
Endogenous Contribution Levels
In our analysis we have deliberately abstracted from the choice of contribution levels, focus-
ing on the coordination problem that fixed costs entail in isolation from other dimensions
of donors’ choices. Nevertheless, the coordination problem can be expected to affect the
volume of donations.
Contribution performance is so poor in our laboratory experiments that, trivially, it could
be improved simply by restricting the choice to either charity. Then, if donors have the
option to withhold their contribution and direct it towards private consumption instead,
they will be more likely to do so when multiple options are available – i.e. coordination
failure across donors may also translate into a reluctance to make donations.
Too see this, consider a setting where contributions have the option of not giving at
all – a discrete choice between giving and not giving – but where the private opportu-
nity cost of giving, ν, for the marginal donor is less than the marginal private benefit, i.e.
ν < 1/cj, j ∈ {1, 2}. This means that provision does not entail free riding, and so an out-
come where all donors make positive contributions to either charity is a Nash equilibrium;
however, if fixed costs are large enough, an outcome with no contributions is also an equilib-
rium. Suppose then that, in this setting, donors face a single option that involves fixed costs,
and compare this scenario with one where donors face two fixed-cost options – as in the sec-
ond set of experiments described in the previous section but with contribution levels now
being endogenous. In both scenarios, depending on parameter values, a no-contributions
outcome could be a Nash equilibrium. However, if donors anticipate that having multiple
options lowers the expected return of marginal contributions (in line with our predictions on
provision performance), they would be less willing to contribute, making a no-contribution
outcome (or a low-contribution outcome) more likely when multiple providers are present.
33For example, with reference to the example discussed in Footnote 16, a uniform grant of 1/9 to both
options, which reduces the size of the residual donation pool to 3− 2/9 = 25/9 and the size of individual
donations from 1 to 25/27, lowers qH from approximately 0.937 to approximately 0.878.
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Other Negative Connotations of Fixed Costs
Donors may dislike fixed costs for reasons that have nothing to do with the arguments we
have presented. For example, in the presence of moral hazard, fixed costs may be taken by
donors as a signal that funds are misused by charity managers – if, for example, managers
obtain more ‘ego rents’ or personal perks from fixed expenditures than from programme
expenditures (although it must be said that opportunities for misuse and misappropriation
of funds are just as great for variable expenditures). Or it may be that the extent of the ‘warm
glow’ (Andreoni, 1990) that donors experience from their donations varies depending on the
perceived destination of the donation.
While it is possible that other considerations play an important role in shaping how
donors relate to fixed costs, even when these considerations are absent – as they are, by de-
sign, in both our theoretical and experimental settings – fixed costs can drive donors away
and can lead to inefficient selection. If donors have additional reasons for disliking fixed
costs, those will only add to the effects that we have described.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has shown that, absent a residual claimant, selection of the most efficient char-
ity cannot be guaranteed: unlike in the case of for-profit firms, the presence of fixed costs
may interfere with competition amongst non-commercial, not-for-profit providers and give
rise to inefficient selection. Experimental evidence suggests that donors’ coordination and
contribution performance can be adversely affected by the presence of fixed costs, that this
effect can be significant, and that donors can be biased against higher-fixed cost providers
even if these are more efficient – which undermines contestability in charity markets.
The debate on the effect of government funding on the private provision of public goods
and services has so far largely ignored the effects of government funding on inter-charity
competition and market structure in the third sector. Our conclusions imply that, once entry
and technology adoption decisions are accounted for, there is no longer a theoretical prior
that government grants that are directed towards charities’ core funding needs should be
neutral, i.e. that they should simply crowd out private donations. On the contrary, govern-
ment grants might be able to affect entry and/or charities’ technology choices – and hence
provision efficiency.
Specifically, selective government subsidization of fixed costs may then be required to
promote efficient selection of service providers (with the caveat we mentioned in Section
2). Funding of charities’ fixed costs can be expected to dominate direct regulation as a way
of promoting efficient selection, as the latter would require the government to have full in-
formation on the technologies of individual providers; but it still requires an assessment of
the comparative severity of the two kinds of failures related to competition and entry: if es-
tablished charities are technologically entrenched and rely on unnecessarily high fixed costs
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technologies, and entry by start-ups can give rise to the adoption of more efficient technolo-
gies, then government funding of core costs should be directed towards start-ups; if instead
start-ups are higher-cost, opportunistic challengers that can take advantage of the higher
fixed costs of more efficient, more established charities in order to divert private funds their
way, making it difficult in turn for established charities to fully exploit opportunities for
economies of scale in provision, then funding the core costs of established charities should
take priority.
Government funding choices do appear to be sensitive to charities’ core funding needs,34
but it is not clear whether this is motivated by the need to promote entry by new charities –
overcoming the implicit entry barriers that fixed costs can create – or instead by the need to
support efficient technology adoption by incumbents.35
Carlo Perroni, University of Warwick and CESIfo
Ganna Pogrebna, University of Birmingham and Alan Turing Institute
Sarah Sandford, ESSEC Business School
Kimberley Scharf, University of Birmingham and CEPR
34Tax return information for a sample of more 48,346 distinct Canadian charities over the period 1997-2005
(T3010 forms made available by the Canada Revenue Agency) reveals a significant positive correlation between
the proportion of fixed costs (as proxied by the category ‘Management and General Administration Expenses’)
in total costs and the proportion of revenue they receive from government, with a one percentage point increase
in the proportion of fixed costs being associated, on average, with almost a two percentage point increase in
the proportion of government funding. This is also directly reflected in a number of institutional arrangements
(e.g. an emphasis on ‘seed’ grants in the dispersion of public funding support to charities).
35There is some evidence to suggest the latter: in the Canadian case, a charity’s age appears to be positively
and significantly correlated with the proportion of government support in its total revenues. Clearly, this
pattern may have nothing to do with optimal policy choices: it may simply be that established charities are
more successful at soliciting government funding.
36
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ej/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ej/uez006/5498293 by U
niversity of W
arw
ick user on 05 July 2019
References
Alchian, A., and Demsetz, H. (1972). ‘Production, information costs, and economic organi-
zation’, American Economic Review, vol. 62, pp. 777–795.
Aldashev, G., Marini, M., and Verdier, T. (2014). ‘Brothers in alms? Coordination between
nonprofits on markets for donations’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 117, pp. 182–200.
Andreoni, J. (1990). ‘Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-
glow giving’, Economic Journal, vol. 100, pp. 464–477.
Andreoni, J. (1998). ‘Toward a theory of charitable fund-raising’, Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 106, pp. 1186–1213.
Baumol, W., and Willig, R. (1981). ‘Fixed costs, sunk costs, entry barriers and sustainability
of monopoly’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 96, pp. 405–431.
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., and Varian, H. (1986). ‘On the private provision of public goods’,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, pp. 25–49.
Bracha A., Menietti M., and Vesterlund, L. (2011). ‘Seeds to succeed? Sequential giving to
public projects’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95, pp. 416–427.
Camerer, C. (1989). ‘An experimental test of several generalized utility theories’, Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 2, pp. 61–104.
Chamberlin, E. (1933). The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory of
Value, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cooper, R., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. (1992). ‘Communication in coordination
games’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, pp. 739–771.
Dixit, A., and Stiglitz, J. (1977). ‘Monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity’,
American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 297–308.
Enke, S. (1945). ‘Consumer cooperatives and economic efficiency’, American Economic Review
vol. 35, pp. 148–155.
Easley, D., O’Hara, M. (1983). ‘The economic role of the nonprofit firm’, The Bell Journal of
Economics vol. 14, pp. 531–538.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). ‘z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.’ Ex-
perimental Economics, vol. 10, pp. 171–178.
Ghatak, M., and Mueller, H. (2010). ‘Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated
agents’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95, pp. 94–105.
Glaeser, E., and Schleifer, A. (2001). ‘Not-for-profit entrepreneurs’, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, vol. 81, pp. 99–115.
Gneezy, U., Keena, E., and Gneezy, A. (2014). ‘Avoiding overhead aversion in charity’, Sci-
ence, vol. 346, pp. 632–635.
37
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ej/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ej/uez006/5498293 by U
niversity of W
arw
ick user on 05 July 2019
Hansmann, H. (1980). ‘The role of the non-profit enterprise’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 89, pp.
835–901.
Hansmann, H. (1981). ‘Nonprofit enterprise in the performing arts’, Bell Journal of Economics,
vol. 12, pp. 341–361.
Institute for Philanthropy (2009). Supportive to the Core: Why Unrestricted Funding Matters.
Institute for Philanthropy, London and New York.
Kasteva, S., and Yildirim, H. (2016). ‘Information, competition, and the quality of charities’,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 144, pp. 64–77.
Krantz, D., and Kunreuther, H. (2007). ‘Goals and Plans in Decision Making’, Judgment and
Decision Making, vol. 2, pp. 137–168.
Lakdawalla, D., and Philipson, T. (2006). ‘The nonprofit sector and industry performance’,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 90, 1681-1698.
Lapointe, S., Perroni, C., Scharf, K., and Tukiainen, J. (2018). ‘Does market size matter for
charities?’ Mimeo, University of Warwick.
List, J., and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2002). ‘The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable
giving: Experimental evidence from a university capital campaign’, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 110, pp. 215–233.
McKelvey, R., and Palfrey, T. (1995). ‘Quantal response equilibria for normal form games’,
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10, pp. 6–38.
Philipson, T., and Posner, R. (2009). ‘Antitrust in the not-for-profit sector’, Journal of Law and
Economics, vol. 52, pp. 1–18.
Romano, R., and Yildrim, H. (2001). ‘Why charities announce donations: A positive per-
spective’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 81, pp. 423–447.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1982). ‘Charitable giving and ‘excessive’ fundraising’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 97, pp. 195–212.
Samuelson, W., and Zeckhauser, R. (1988). ‘Status quo bias in decision making’, Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 1, pp. 7–59.
Scharf, K. (2014). ‘Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities
and implications for public funding’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 114, pp. 50–57.
Selten, R. (1975). ‘A reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in ex-
tensive games’, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 4, pp. 25–55.
Smith, J.M., and Price, G. (1973). ‘The logic of animal conflict’, Nature, vol. 246, pp. 15–18.
Stahl, D., and Wilson, P. (1994). ‘Experimental evidence on players’ models of other players’,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 25, pp. 309–327.
True and Fair Foundation (2015). A Hornet’s Nest: A Review of Charitable Spending by UK Chari-
ties (http://www.trueandfairfoundation.com/content/file/feature/reviewhornetsnest-
report-into-charitable-spending-UK-charities-12-dec-15.pdf).
38
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ej/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ej/uez006/5498293 by U
niversity of W
arw
ick user on 05 July 2019
A Appendix
Table A.1: Donor Coordination Experiments: Descriptive Statistics
Experiment
variant
Description
Median
age
Proportion
female
Proportion
Economics,
Psychology or
Business
Administration
Proportion of
experienced
participants
(those who took part in
experiments but not similar
ones before)
1 Laboratory: Baseline 20 0.51 0.74 0.87
2 Laboratory: Incumbency 20 0.60 0.80 0.66
3 Laboratory: Visible Fixed Cost 21 0.55 0.73 0.88
4 Online: Actual Charity 24.5 0.47 0.70 1.00
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Table A.2: Donor Coordination Experiments: Payoffs and Experimental Results
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Table A.3: Donor Coordination Experiments:
Actual and Predicted Changes across Payoff Treatments
Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 − A A A A D D A A A D D A A A A D D A A
2 A − A A A D D D A A D D A A A A D D A A
3 A A − A A D D D D A D D D A A A D D A A
4 A A A − A D D D D D D D D D D A A D A A
5 A A A A − A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
6 D D D D A − A A A A A A A A A D D A A A
7 D D D D A A − A A A D A A A A A A A A A
8 A D D D A A A − A A D D A A A A A D A A
9 A A D D A A A A − A D D − A A A A D A A
10 A A A D A A A A A − D D D A A A A A A A
11 D D D D A A D D D D − A A A A A A D A A
12 D D D D A A A D D D A − A A A A A − A A
13 A A D D A A A A − D A A − A A A A A A A
14 A A A D A A A A A A A A A − D A A A A A
15 A A A D A A A A A A A A A D − A A A A A
16 A A A A A D A A A A A A A A A − D A A A
17 D D D A A D A A A A A A A A A D − A A A
18 D D D D A A A D D A D − A A A A A − A A
19 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A − A
20 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A −
An ‘A’ denotes cases where the sign of the experimental effect on choice frequency of mov-
ing from the payoff treatment identified in the first column of the table to the the payoff
treatment identified in the first row of the table agrees with the sign of the effect predicted
by the theory (75% of the total number of comparisons). A ‘D’ denotes cases where actual
and predicted changes are in disagreement (25% of the total number of comparisons).
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